For centuries, the highest figure in human culture and society was the
resident religious head. The Jewish high
priests of antiquity, the Catholic Popes and the oracles of ancient Greece were
all held in the highest esteem. Even the
Pharaohs of ancient Egypt were considered to be high priests of the gods. If a great problem arose in society, everyone
would look to their religious leaders for a solution. As such, theology went unquestioned as the
highest possible avenue of study.
This
all changed with the advent of modern science.
Men and women in lab coats are now the popular experts on any number of
academic and intellectual issues. Yet,
religion continues on in a very prominent way.
Very few of the six or so billion people on earth would consider
themselves atheists. So how do we, who
revere science, understand our religion in light of the secular academy? And how do we practice our secular sciences
in light of our religious beliefs? It
seems that a model is needed to help us relate the disciplines of science and
religion. In this paper, four such
models will be offered. One of these
models will be supported, defended and illustrated using two separate test
cases.
Barbour’s Four Models
Historically,
there have been a variety of ways by which people have attempted to relate
science and theology. Ian Barbour categorizes these attempts into four broad
models: Conflict, Independence, Dialogue and Integration.[1]
The
conflict model holds that science and theology are consistently at odds with
one another. Either science is being
impeded by religious belief, or religion is being besieged by atheistic
science. Some hold this position because
they believe religion holds back honest scientific inquiry. Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins has
been quoted as saying, “I am against religion because it teaches us to be
satisfied with not understanding the world.”[2]
Others point to the lack of a moral
compass in science to show that it is in conflict with moral religion. Atrocities committed in the name of
scientific progress are often cited. Religious
peoples favoring the conflict model often cite the Nazi regime of the
1940s. Historian Richard Evans reports
the gruesome experiments carried out on Jews in the Nazi concentration camps
but writes that the Nazis saw these as necessary for the advancement of
science. “German medical science had
uncovered the causes of several major diseases and contributed massively to
improving the health of the population over the previous decades. Surely,
therefore, it was justified in eliminating negative influences as well?”[3] The conflict model is also the most
popular model today. For example, the trial
of Galileo under the Catholic Church for proposing a heliocentric universe is
taught to students of all ages. It seems
natural, then, to assume science and religion are in constant conflict with one
another.
Others
have held that science and religion merely address mutually exclusive truth
claims. This is known as the
independence model. Stephen Jay Gould’s principle
of non-overlapping magisterial, or NOMA, is a popular example of this
model. While Gould believes both science
and religion are equally important and necessary in human life, “they remain
logically distinct and fully separate in style of inquiry, however much and
however tightly we must integrate the insights of both magisteria to build the
rich and full view of life traditionally designated as wisdom.”[4] Within such a model, if either science or
religion appears to be in conflict, it is because one or the other has
overstepped its boundary. While both
address objective truth claims, they cannot both address the same aspect of
reality at the same time and in the same meaning.
Barbour’s
third model is the dialogue model. As
the name suggests, this model encourages the idea that science and religion can
engage in discussions and learn from each other. They may ask where one discipline begins and
the other ends, or they may share methodological schemes as in when one tries
to apply empirical tests in the world of theology.
The fourth of
Barbour’s models is integration.
Examples of this model can include when one tries to infer the existence
of God from natural sources, when scientific theories are integrated into one’s
theological understanding, or when one arrives at a comprehensive understanding
of reality that includes both scientific and theological truths. Garry DeWeese uses the term “Convergence” for
this model, as he believes that science and theology should retain their
disciplinary integrity.[5] This is the model that I favor and the model
that the remainder of this paper will endeavor to support.
Against Scientism
Those that
ascribe to the conflict model or the independence model often hold to a strong
or weak view of scientism, views that the integration model rejects. Strong scientism is the view that science
defines rationality and is the only method by which one can discern truth. If something cannot be known by scientific
investigation, then it is not true or rational.
Weak scientism, which is more popular, holds that truths of a non-scientific
nature may exist and that they may have some status of rationality. However, scientific rationality and truths
have authority and have more value than any other form of inquiry. While someone may have their own thoughts
about the mind, the authoritative view is that the mind is best explained via
neurophysiology and psychology. If
either strong or weak scientism is true, then a convergence model of science
and religion cannot be correct. However,
if we can show that strong scientism and weak scientism are deficient views,
then we can show that aspects of the conflict, independence and versions of the
dialogue models are left wanting. For if science is not the only method, or even
the strongest method for arriving at truth, then it must be supplemented by
other avenues of inquiry and rationality.
I propose that theology, within a convergence model, should be and is
one of those avenues.
Strong
scientism, as the more severe of the scientism positions, is relatively easy to
dismiss. First, it is
self-refuting. The statement that
“science is the only legitimate foundation to find truth” is not itself a
scientifically verifiable statement. It
is a philosophical statement about science.
Moreover, there are several other non-scientific presuppositions that
allow science to be practiced. The laws
of logic and mathematics, for example, cannot be proven scientifically. Yet they are foundational to the scientific
enterprise. Since these problems are easily seen and difficult to ignore, most
who favor scientism have adopted weak scientism.
Yet
weak scientism is not without faults. First,
along with strong scientism, weak scientism has a difficult time allowing for
the philosophical presuppositions that are foundational for the practice of
science. J.P. Moreland and William Lane
Craig provide a list of several scientific presuppositions that are merely
assumed aside from the aforementioned laws of logic and mathematics. They include the existence of a
theory-independent world, the orderly nature of the external world, the
knowablility of the external world, the existence of truth, the uniformity of
nature and the ability to trust induction as a method to find truth.[6] Since these presuppositions are not
scientific, weak scientism would have us believe that they are somehow less
authoritative than scientific statements.
Yet these scientific statements would not exist if not for the
non-scientific foundational truths that were previously assumed. It seems to follow then that the
presuppositional truths must be assumed to be just as authoritative if not more
so than the generated scientific truths.
Second,
neither form of scientism adequately allows for the existence of true and
rationally held beliefs outside of science.
Moral truths and self-evidential truths serve as examples. Moreover, many of these truths seem to have
better justification than many truth claims believed within science. One cannot prove scientifically that rape is
wrong, but most people hold this to be true.
Moreover, they hold this to be true and have more justification than the
theory of Darwinian evolution. A
further problem for scientism that parallels its inability to allow for these
truths is that scientific truths have changed repeatedly throughout history
while many truths outside of science have remained consistent. The objective truth that murder is wrong has
persisted over many different cultures and centuries. The scientific truths regarding the placement
of the earth in the universe has changed dramatically and repeatedly over the
same time span. Moreland and Craig
write, “It is not hard to believe that many of our currently held scientific beliefs
will and should be revised or abandoned in one hundred years, but it would be
hard to see how the same could be said of the extrascientific propositions.”[7]
Thus
we can confidently conclude that science cannot be the only source, nor even
the most important source, of truth. Many
truths about philosophy, morality and theology seem to be more foundational and
more objective than many scientific truths we accept today. Moreover, some of these truths provide the
very foundation on which science functions, thus rendering the conflict and
independence models insufficient. What
is often overlooked is that the philosophical idea of naturalism functions as a
sort of religion for many scientists.
Regarding science’s implicit religious doctrines, Van Till writes, “What
often confuses the issue… is the fact that this particular ‘religion’ of
naturalism is so commonly embedded in works that are presented to readers as
being no more than popularizations of modern science.”[8] Furthermore, the dialogue model, which
supposes a distinction between scientific knowledge and non-scientific
knowledge, fails to recognize the role that non-scientific truth claims play in
all scientific inquiry. We are thus left
with the integration model of relating science and religion. However,
we are not left with integration merely as a process of elimination. Integration has its own strengths which
strengthen its claim as the appropriate means to relate science and
religion. We will now turn to how one
may approach the integration of theological claims with scientific claims.
Application of Integration
While I favor
DeWeese’s use of the term “Convergence,” I will continue to utilize Barbour’s
term of integration for continuity’s sake.
However, the idea of convergence does seem to more appropriately capture
the idea that there is one collective and objective truth that both science and
religion are attempting to describe.
Indeed, the existence of such an objective truth is something that both
science and religion recognize regardless of which model one ascribes to. Furthermore, science and religion are both
tools that purportedly exist to find and describe objective truth. As such, they have a common goal. If one has the goal of constructing a
skyscraper, it makes little sense to utilize different tools in a conflicting
or independent way. Instead, one would
utilize cranes, bulldozers, dump trucks and excavators in an integrative
way. As we have seen, religious truths
and scientific truths are integrated in a complex and complete unity of
objective truth. Therefore, we must
investigate this truth with tools that are equally integrated.
It
is one thing to recognize the need for integration. It is another to describe how one might apply
such a model. In some cases, integration
causes no controversy as it is not necessarily applied. The scientific fact that every macroscopic
physical action causes an equal and opposite reaction does not seem to carry much
theological weight. Likewise, the
theological claim that Abraham’s trust in God was credited to him as
righteousness appears to have no bearing in the scientific realm. In such cases, there appears to be no overlap
between religious truth and scientific truth.
While they both point to the same objective reality, there is no chance
for conflict or active integration.
In
cases of overlap, there may either be mutual strengthening or conflict. In the case of strengthening, scientific
evidence may directly support religious claims or vice versa. The current scientific model of the Big Bang
supports the Biblical claim that the universe had a beginning when God created
it. Likewise, many theological teachings
encourage the study of the natural world in order to gain a deeper
understanding of reality. Such overlap
offers explicit support for the integration model.
However,
conflict often arises when theological and scientific claims overlap. While the aforementioned Big Bang theory does
offer support to the Christian theological doctrine of creation, it also seems
to contradict a young earth interpretation of the Genesis narrative. The scientific theory of Darwinian Evolution
is at odds with varying version of theological creationism. Human stem cell research clashes with deeply
held theological convictions regarding the human soul and personhood. In order for the integration model to be
successful, it must first show that it can successfully handle such conflicts.
According
to the integration model being proposed, both science and religion are
attempting to explain the same external reality. It follows then that if science and religion
are claiming two mutually incompatible things about this external reality that
one or both are incorrect in their claims.
This does not mean that science or religion is illegitimate as a method
of arriving at objective truth. Rather,
it means that both enterprises are carried out by people who make
mistakes. Thus, when conflict arises
within the integration model, one should look at one’s science or theology for
flaws. This must be done on a case by
case basis. While in one case one’s
theological reasoning may be flawed and thus in conflict with science, in
another case it might be one’s scientific reasoning that may be flawed. But it if is to be done on a case by case
basis, on what criteria is it to be judged?
DeWeese and others have offered several questions to ask in order to
direct our adjudication,[9]
and I offer several of them here.
First,
assuming that an actual contradiction is at hand, one should first look to see
if either the scientific or the theological claims are axiomatic within their
discipline. For example, if one’s
scientific claims contradict one’s Christian claim to the deity of Christ, then
one must first look for errors within one’s scientific claims. Otherwise, one’s Christian theology would be
utterly destroyed. Similarly, science
necessitates the human ability to observe the external world as it is. If one’s theology teaches that demons
actively and continually distort our perception of reality, then this would
strike at the core of scientific inquiry and one’s theological beliefs ought to
be suspect.
Second,
one must consider the amount of independent support for conflicting theological
and scientific claims. One scientific
experiment does not warrant the repudiation of a hundred clear theological
teachings. Nor do one or two obscure
Scriptural texts render a well-established scientific theory null and
void. For example, a cursory reading of
Genesis might lead one to believe that there was no pain or suffering among the
animals before the creation of Adam.
However, an in depth fossil record shows ample evidence that carnivorous
animals existed long before mankind.
Since the Bible is largely silent on the issue of pre-fall animal
suffering, and since the scriptures that apparently speak to this are few and
less than explicit, one should not discredit the fossil record evidence based
on theological reasons.
Third,
one should take care to make sure that neither the scientific claims nor the theological
claims suffer from significant internal problems. Internal logical contradictions, such as
those mentioned in strong scientism above, render any claims to be
fallacious. But there are other lesser
types of internal problems. New
archaeological finds may render one’s interpretation of historical theology
questionable. A new scientific discovery
may call into question long standing scientific theories. Such internal problems need not discredit a
claim made by science or theology, but they may weaken them. Thus, if these weakened claims come into
conflict with an opposing scientific or theological claim, their weakened
status should be further considered.
Fourth,
one may wish to suspend judgement altogether if a decision is not forced and if
neither the theological evidence nor the scientific evidence is strong enough
to persuade a reconsideration of the other.
This is typically the case when the two claims are not central to the
truth claims made by either side. For
example, one might believe the Pharaoh described in the book of Exodus to be
Ramses I instead of Amenhotep II or Thutmose II. However, all have historical evidences in
their favor and none is conclusive.
Therefore, it is advisable to suspend judgement in the absence of
further historical evidence.
Objections to Integration
Before
we move on to case studies involving our proposed integration model, we should
first briefly discuss a couple objections that have been raised against
it. First, it has been argued that by
integrating religion into science, we have introduced a “god-of-the-gaps”
mentality in which god is merely inserted into areas which science has not yet
spoken to. This is then used as an
apologetic by theists much like the natural theologians of years past. Furthermore, it is argued that since science
is increasingly filling these gaps, this is really just a slow weening off of
religion altogether.
This
is clearly just a reassertion of weak scientism that assumes that scientific
knowledge is superior to any and all religious knowledge. There are several replies that may be offered
in turn. First, there is nothing in the
integration model which limit’s the activity of a deity. If one were to adopt a Christian perspective,
it is clear that God is sovereign of all of nature and continually upholds
it. As such, he upholds science as well. Moreover, there need not be any apologetic
aim within the integration model at all.
Moreland and Craig write, “A Christian theist may simply believe that he
or she should consult all we know or have reason to believe is true – including
theological beliefs – in forming, evaluation and testing scientific theories
and in explaining scientific phenomena.”[10]
Second,
the integration model does not seek to insert theology only when science is
lacking. Certain theological truths are
more central and should be expected to play a more pivotal role in nature. The falleness of man and nature should be
expected to manifest itself in natural pain and suffering. One should have theologically expected the
universe to have had a beginning even before the Big Bang became a popular
theory.
Third,
while it may be true that scientific theories are covering more ground and the
gaps are getting smaller, it does not follow that there will eventually be no
gaps at all. Indeed, biogenesis and
cosmogenesis are two examples of phenomena that are doubtful to ever be
explained by science. If God acts in a
primary way via miracles, gaps should be expected. Moreover, rarity is an attribute of miraculous
events. This means that most of God’s
actions are through secondary causes, which are able to be investigated via
science. God’s actions through primary
causes are thus all the more obvious because they are so rare.
Finally,
one needs to differentiate between historical science and empirical science
when discussing a “god-of-the-gaps” theology.
Empirical science is carried out within a laboratory setting and is
based on repeatable, regularly occurring events. As such, it is immune from talk of the
miraculous. However, historical science
focuses on past events which are not repeatable. It is thus legitimate to discuss God’s
primary causal activity in the historical sciences while it is not in the
empirical sciences. If something is not
yet explainable by science in the empirical sense, it ought to remain an open
question instead of a hasty assertion of the miraculous.
The
second objection to the integration model is similar to the sentiment posed by
Richard Dawkins earlier in this paper, namely that religion stifles scientific
inquiry. It is argued that God’s primary
causal activity is not fruitful in guiding new research or yielding testable
results. Therefore, an appeal to God’s
direct causation cannot be an acceptable scientific practice. Regarding this idea, Richard Dickerson
writes, “The most insidious evil of supernatural creationism is that it stifles
curiosity and therefore blunts the intellect.”[11]
In
response, one might first point out that something can be true without being
fruitful in guiding new inquiry. If God
truly did create the universe out of nothing via a Big Bang like process, this
would be a onetime occurrence that would never be repeatable. Thus, further research in the specific area
of “creation ex nihilo” would be impossible.
Yet, while further research in this area would be halted, it would not
necessarily entail the fallaciousness of the creation claim, especially if the
claim were made for good theological and scientific reasons. Secondly, even if one were to grant that
theological concepts have not yet generated new lines of inquiry, it does not
follow that such lines of inquiry would not be developed in the future. Lastly, it may be that in a theological
framework a certain phenomenon may be considered basic while in a naturalistic
framework it is not and vice versa. This
will clearly have implications on further inquiry into the phenomenon for the
different frameworks.
Case Studies for Integration
Now
that we have briefly defended the integration model against objections, it is
time we look at case studies. I will
look at two separate case studies that exemplify different capabilities of the
integration model. The first example
will showcase how the model may offer mutual enrichment for both science and
religion in areas that are not necessarily fiercely debated, but could be problematic. The second example will show how the
integration model can deal with a historically contentious issue where science
and religion appear to be in outright conflict.
Our
first example will be the so-called problem of the applicability of
mathematics. Most, if not all of science
is based on the language of mathematics.
Quantum physics is almost entirely explained using mathematical
equations. Yet, we have very little
philosophical reason (and no scientific reason) to expect the abstract world of
mathematics to interact this way with the physical world. Einstein once asked, “How is it possible that
mathematics, a product of human thought that is independent of experience, fits
so excellently the objects of physical reality?”[12]
Historically,
there have been two views on this problem, neither of which necessitates a
Christian or theistic worldview, and both of which have flaws as solutions. The first is the platonic or realist view of
mathematics. This view holds that
mathematics exists as an objective reality outside of the natural world. Oxford mathematical physicist Roger Penrose
says, “Mathematical truth is not determined arbitrarily by the rules of some
‘man-made’ formal system, but has an absolute nature, and lies beyond any such
system of specifiable rules.”[13] As
such, mathematics is unchanging and outside of the human mind. It can thus be harvested to explain things
that do occur in the natural realm. The
shortcoming of this view is that it does not offer an explanation as to why or
how the external mathematical realm has any active or passive influence
whatsoever on the physical world.
Of
course, an objective non-physical mathematical world does not fit into the
philosophical naturalism that many practitioners of modern science adopt. As such, many have come to adopt an
anti-realist view of mathematics. The
Einstein quote above hints at how anti-realists view mathematics. They believe that it is a purely human
construct. Since man is the direct
result of natural selection acting upon random variation, mathematics is
likewise a product of evolution. It is
easy to see how an individual who “puts two and two together” in an appropriate
way has a survival edge over one who does not.
As a survival tool, math became genetically ingrained into the human
brain. According to such a naturalist
perspective, math has no existence outside of the human brain. Furthermore, since humanity has supposedly evolved
from one or very few common ancestors, this genetically imbedded mathematics is
common to all humanity. Thus,
mathematics merely appears universal.
The
naturalistic problem is that the anti-realist position sheds no light on the
applicability problem. The math required
for most scientific application is superbly complex. It is in no way clear that such abstract and
complex mathematics was at any point beneficial for the survival of the human
species. Furthermore, if our mathematics
is subjective to the human race, then the science based on that math is also
subjective. In other words, if we were
to contact another intelligent race in the universe, they might have an
entirely different system of logic, math and physical sciences. This runs contrary to the very claim of
naturalism that science is “true” in some objective sense.
However,
if one were to view the applicability problem within an integration model, the
problem may be solved almost immediately.
We may first look at the internal problems within the anti-realist
position and favor the platonic position.
Next, we see that the problem with the platonic position (that it is not
obvious how the mathematical realm interacts with the physical) is easily
solvable once an intelligent deity is allowed to be the conduit for which
mathematics is consistently applied to the physical world. Christian mathematician John Byl writes, “Within
the context of Christianity it makes sense to talk about the objective
existence of numbers and mathematical truths.
Once God is removed, there is nowhere to place abstract mathematical
concepts and nobody to guarantee their truthfulness.”[14] By integrating one’s religious ideas with the realm of scientific
application, one is left with a mutually enriched perspective which allows for
the applicability of mathematics in and objective and fruitful way.
A second
test case in which conflict can be resolved using the integration model is that
of the evolution-creation debate. It can be safely assumed that the reader is
well aware of the conflict between naturalistic Darwinian evolution and the
Judeo-Christian view of creation. The
Darwinian side claims that it is based on science and reason. The Judeo-Christian side claims to have
divine revelation in its favor. How does
the integration model here presented handle this situation?
First, we
should look to see if the conflict impinges upon foundational or axiomatic
claims on either side. It seems that it does in both cases. On the Darwinian side, the claim that God
miraculously created life impinges upon the foundational scientific assumption
of uniformitarianism. Moreover, it
contradicts the naturalistic assumptions of many Darwinists. Conversely, this naturalism is directly
contradictory to the claim that God is actively involved in creation and
contradicts the doctrine of God as creator and sustainer of all things.
Thus, we
must look at independent support for each side.
It seems that there is ample evidence for God as creator from other fields
such as philosophy, cosmology, ethics and logic. Meanwhile, there is little support for naturalism
as a position other than a mere axiomatic assertion. However, there is ample evidence within the
fossil record that shows a slow progression of ever more complicated biological
lifeforms over the past billion years. This lends support to the general idea
of evolution, but not necessarily to a naturalistic form of the theory.
Third, we
shall consider if either side has significant internal problems. Here we see some headway in our integration
model, for the naturalistic assumptions behind Darwinian evolution are seen to
be fatally flawed. Within naturalism,
there is a deeply ingrained belief in scientism. As we have seen, scientism is deeply flawed. Moreover, Darwinian evolution has no answer
as to how life began to exist. Conversely, if one were to adopt a young
earth creationism, there appears to be ample physical evidence that supports an
old earth fostering millions of years of biological change. If, however, one adopts an old-earth reading
of Genesis, these internal conflicts decrease dramatically.
Lastly, we
may entertain the idea of suspending judgement.
While this is certainly possible in this case, I do not think it is
necessary. I believe once naturalism has
been removed from the theory of Darwinian evolution and the idea of God as
creator and sustainer of the process has been included, the previous conflict
has been greatly reduced if not eliminated.
Conclusion
We can therefore conclude that the integration model is preferable over
the conflict, independence and dialogue models.
After one rejects a strong or weak form of scientism, the integration
model rises to the top as the model of choice.
The application of the application model can be approached methodically
and thoughtfully so as to not explicitly favor either science or religion
uniformly in all cases. Objections
against integration are generally offshoots of scientism and naturalism and can
sufficiently answered. Finally, we saw
that the integration model can be used to mutually enrich both science and
religion as well as resolving apparent conflicts between the fields.
[1]
Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science:
Historical and Contemporary Issues (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco,
1997), pp. 77-105.
[2]Michael
Ruse, Science and Spirituality: Making
Room for Faith in the Age of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), p. 3. Ruse attributes this
quote to RichardDawkins.net, quote 49.
[3]
Richard Evans, “How Hitler Perverted the Course of Science,” The Telegraph. December 1st,
2008. Web. Accessed December 12th, 2016.
[4]
Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science
and Religion in the Fullness of Life, (New York, NY: Ballantine Books,
1999), p. 59.
[5]
Garry DeWeese, “Understanding Nature,” Doing
Philosophy, March 22nd, 2011. p. 291.
[6]
J.P. Moreland & William Lane Craig, Philosophical
Foundations for a Christian Worldview, (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic,
2003). p.248.
[7]
Moreland & Craig, p. 350.
[8] Howard
Van Till, “Partnership: Science and Christian Theology as Partners in
Theorizing,” Science and Christianity:
Four Views, (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000). p. 201.
[9]
DeWeese, pp. 292-293.
[10]
Moreland & Craig, p. 363.
[11]
Richard Dickerson, “The Game of Science: Reflections After Arguing with Some
Rather Overwrought People,” Perspectives
on Science and Christian Faith. 44 (June 1992). P. 137.
[12] Max
Jammer, Einstein and Religion, Princeton University Press, 1921.
[13]
Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind,
Searching for the Missing Science of Consciousness (Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press, 1994). P. 418.
[14]John
Byl, The Divine Challenge: On Matter,
Mind, Math & Meaning. (Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth,2004). p. 255.
